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ABSTRACT

The author suggests that the ecology movement in Western Europe has reached the limits of reactive politics and cannot achieve more unless it adopts a different strategy. Surveys and referenda show that the public has an overwhelmingly good opinion of the ecology movement but that few will vote on it in elections. Thus, the movement has had little effect on public policy, which is still being formed by the same actors (business, government bureaucracies, labor unions, political parties) as well as institutions or policy-making forums. This irony exists for two reasons: the movement has no comprehensive approach to politics and certain forces in society and politics intensify impulses working in the direction of growth rather than check those impulses. These forces include consumers, labor unions, business, government bureaucracies, political parties, and the corporatist pattern. At the same time, candidates for the ecology movement take no positions about a whole range of issues that are important both for the evolution of advanced industrial societies and to its citizens. As long as comprehensive positions are not worked out, the ecology movement cannot appear credible to the large numbers of people who might vote for it. It is imperative that the movement become more truly political.
(Author/KC)

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POLICY-MAKING STRUCTURES AND THEIR BIASES TOWARDS POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ECOLOGY

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The late 1960s brought, in most of the advanced industrial societies, the rise of a new outlook among the public towards economic and social life. One ingredient of this new outlook was a decline in the support for those policies which accorded near -absolute priority to industrial expansion and economic growth, i.e. to goals which in the preceding two decades were so self-evident that they were hardly ever questioned.[1] This development was accompanied by a new sensitivity for ecological balance: many took to the idea that an expanding industrial civilization was consuming its own biological basis. In general, there was a shift away from the interest in a higher standard of living, defined in quantitative terms, and towards a concern for a better life, defined in terms much more comprehensive than purely economic ones.

This shift in values, concerns and priorities was reflected in new attitudes (as evident from public opinion surveys); but also in behavior, in new forms of political activism; in a repoliticization of economic and social issues which were considered settled and non-controversial with the onset of the "end of ideology", beginning in the late 1940s and the 1950s. It would only be normal to expect that such a shift would have a major impact on the evolution of the advanced industrial countries, on the policies which shape their economic and social life. The imperative of growth and productivity had a wide-ranging impact: not only on industrial policy, but also on social welfare and redistribution policy, on urban, agricultural, land use, on energy policy...and the enumeration could be continued. All these areas should in turn show the impact of the shift in values and concerns. In fact, some changes did occur; but they were either motivated by traditional state preoccupations (thus e.g. the

policy of energy savings in the area of mileage standards or insulation, dictated by balance of payments considerations more than responding to ecological priorities), or else they are of minor significance because remedial in character, dealing only with the symptoms of the affluent lifestyle and designed as much to perpetuate that lifestyle, and the economy underlying it, as to reform them. (Thus, many of the pollution control measures can be viewed as steps taken in order to make more quantitative growth palatable and acceptable again in situations where high density would otherwise act as a deterrent to such a development). A decisive shift in policy responding to the new values and aspirations in a clear way can hardly be found.

Do we have to conclude then that those aspirations and concerns never really did take hold; that they were given excessive publicity in the early days of their short life and collapsed as soon as the economic difficulties of the mid-1970s set in? There is no lack of arguments in this direction.[2] Whatever their validity with regard to the American scene, I do not think that they give an accurate assessment of the situation in Western Europe. Public opinion surveys in many (perhaps all) of these countries show the increasing strength of the new outlook over the course of the past decade, with perhaps some tapering off (but not a pronounced decline) in the late 1970s. Certainly, the energy crisis of 1973/1974 did not bring the end of this movement but rather brought it to unprecedented importance. Particularly in the field of energy, widespread activism develop ed only after that date. As a result, we are now used to the fact that nuclear power programs are likely to create major political controversies, as they did in many countries after 1974.[3] In fact, it was the energy crisis which posed the alternatives with a new urgency, since some form of adaptation to the new situation was clearly unavoidable; however, it could take different forms.

Put in extreme terms, the choices could be seen as follows: On the one hand, one could adopt a strategy which in the long run would reduce the use of non-renewable resources and also reduce dependence on out-side energy supplies; this strategy had a natural affinity to the new values that had just surfaced. On the other hand, one could step up the drive for productivity, accelerate industrialization and increase the economic surplus in order both to offset external debts from energy imports and to launch ambitious energy development programs at home, primarily in the field of nuclear power; this would not alter the principle of economic expansion underlying the political economy of the countries under consideration, and was thought to enhance the international position of such countries as well. Possibly destabilizing side-effects would have to be controlled politically.[4]

Most Western European countries were divided over the choice that had to be made. How was this fact reflected in their political life? On the one side seemed to be the new concerns, expressing themselves-- depending on the country and the legal role which they accord to grass-roots groups and basis initiatives-- in demonstrations, spontaneous initiatives, ad hoc-groups and organizations (later on, after some delay, also in political parties) that practiced the politics of petition and protest, of occupations and sit-ins, of administrative challenges and law-suits, and of referenda with or (.. in most cases) without legally binding sanction; all this shall be discussed in further detail below. The activists who undertook these efforts and are typically representative of the new values and base their appeal on them; they do not, usually, attack a single installation but the spirit, the logic which made them apparently necessary. They represent the core of what on the following pages shall be called the Ecology Movement, with what perhaps is not

the most fortunate expression since many of its members are not only concerned about the nature-endangering symptoms of industrial society but take a much more comprehensive view of things, encompassing human relations as much as man's relations with nature. They have made an important point of always staying close to the basis, from which they derive their strength. For all its justification, such a strategy has condemned them to challenging policies once they were made, and are about to be implemented; it has deprived them of initiative and reduced them to a "reactive" approach, reduced them to reacting to policies which originate in settings and institutions to which they have no access; this in turn has enabled these institutions to all but ignore the Ecology Movement, or rather to consider them a small though potentially dangerous outside nuisance or constraint.

Under these circumstances, public policy is made by and large as before the rise of the Ecology Movement and the concerns on which it is based: by the same actors, and in the same institutional setting. These actors (business, government bureaucracies, labor unions, to some extent political parties) as well as institutions or policy-making forums or networks (the économie concertée-type and the corporatist pattern stick out as dominant)[5] have all been unresponsive to the social changes (with regard to aspirations and concerns) that have taken place during the past decade, as Suzanne Berger has shown.[6] Partly this is the result of intentional, purposeful design, as in the case of corporatism, where an oligarchic structure is thought to improve the functioning of the institution of corporatism itself; with regard to constituency pressure (e.g. from the labor rank and file), it is held that it is likely to be disruptive, so that "democratic" labor unions could not function appropriately in

tripartite negotiations; and as far as responsiveness to political parties is concerned, the whole point of corporatist institutions is, in one interpretation, to insulate economic and social policy formulation from the inflationary and in the long term irrational influence of political parties.[7] But political parties themselves have not shown much receptiveness to the new concerns, perhaps because of the orthodoxy (or ideology) which characterizes programs of the "pragmatic" parties of the end of ideology-era (whose pragmatism in fact consisted in relegating the old ideological divisions and replacing them with a new ideology, so widely shared at first that it was not even perceived as such, ie. the faith in economic growth and its blessings).[8] Whatever the reason, orthodoxy or inertia, political parties have not been able to incorporate the new concerns, a fact which has weakened their own legitimacy (and vitality) in a significant way. But even though both the political parties and the participants in corporatist policy-making have been quite unresponsive to changes in outlook and aspirations, they quite naturally still have control over policy initiative and, in most cases, implementation.

The predictable result of such developments has been a striking contrast, and occasionally open clash, between the politics of the new concerns, organized by the Ecology Movement, on one hand, and the traditional politics of established actors and institutions on the other. Repeatedly the policy of these institutions has been frustrated, at last in part, by strong opposition. But no alternative policies have emerged which are sufficiently comprehensive and specific as to outline, in concrete (i.e. not utopian) terms, a different course of development for advanced industrial societies. This is not only an unstable situation and perhaps an irrational one; it is also

highly frustrating and thus likely to end before much more time goes by. Can a lesson be drawn from the developments of the last decade and the situation to which they have led; is there a lesson for the 1980s in the experience of the 1970s?

In my view, the lesson is that the "Ecology Movement" has reached the limits of "reactive" politics; it cannot achieve more unless it adopts a different strategy. In some form, it will have to get access to policy iniative and formulation. This does not necessarily mean access to the existing established structures and institutions; there is good reason to distrust such an approach, as these institutions are heavily biased against any concerns that it might bring forward. Perhaps the strategy should be to shift policy-making to a different forum. Not to that of mere citizen participation, which is restricted to a negative role problably by nature; but to truly political institutions (such as parliaments), where political values can be translated into policies in a more or less democratic fashion. This would by no means represent a minor undertaking: the sphere of economic and social policies has not been politicized for decades now, and perhaps never was politicized in democratic countries. The first governments that assumed extensive responsibilities in the management of economic and social life in this century were not democratic (thus the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, Germany under Hitler); and when "active government"--a term used by Shonfield to describe the extensive role played by most Western governments in economic and social life since World War II--started in democratic countries, this development coincided with the politics of productivity, of end of ideology, of management techniques such as Keynesianism, elimination of bottlenecks or export-led growth, approaches which all have in common the avoidance of politics in the

sense of a conflict that expresses the clash of values, of outlooks and philosophies. Not that such conflicts did not exist; but they did not greatly affect the sphere of economic and social life; there common notions reigned, at least as far as the goals for the medium term were concerned.

Thus the politicization of economic and social life would represent a major innovation for Western European democracies. It would also represent a task of formidable dimensions for the Ecology Movement, which would have to develop considerably beyond its present form and content, since it would have to formulate policy alternatives for a wide range of fields; it could not longer restrict itself to such matters as energy and environmental protection, but would also have to deal with employment, investment, international trade and more generally international power, and most importantly perhaps (though this by no means compdetes the list) with redistribution. Only in this way can an alternative be formulated to the still prevailing impulse towards expansion; and only by politicizing such issues can they be taken from the grip of those actors that have a vested interest in such an impulse. In Sheldon Wolin's terms, this would allow Western countries to move, from their presently dominant regimes of "political economy" marked by economic aspirations combined with political apathy on the part of these countries' citizens, to a political democracy in which citizens would take an active part in shaping the economic relations which pervade their lives.[9]

Nature and Depth of the New Concerns

While the existence of the new concerns or the sympathy for the Ecology Movement can hardly be questioned, it is not obvious just how deep all this goes. Ecology could represent some form of utopia where one

gathers all the ideas that one likes to dream of but would never act upon; a refuge, in other words, from the harshness and unpleasantness of everyday life.[10] Or an ambiguous public could act sometimes on one set of values, sometimes on the other (and the attitudes expressed in surveys might clash with the behavior of the same people acting as consumers). The dimensions of the new concerns need therefore to be explored. The following data are partly survey evidence comparing the depth of sympathy for or commitment to the goals of the Ecology Movement; partly they draw on election or voting data. The resulting contrasts are well worth exploring.

There is some evidence that the rise of support for the Ecology Movement follows a similar pattern in the countries of the European Community.[11] But for our purposes it is not crucial whether the following data are representative in a precise way. Thus the important thing about the French data that follow is not the absolute level of support for a particular alternative; what matters are the different levels of identification with the Ecology Movement depending on the way the questions are put. The surveys show that the public overwhelmingly has a good opinion of the Ecology Movement; that many people feel close to this movement; but that few will vote for it in elections. The number of those who have a good opinion of the Ecology Movement thus increased from 64% in January 1978 (bad opinion: 16%) to 70% in January 1980 (bad opinion: 11%).[12] The number of those who "more or less identify" with the Ecology Movement increased from 24% in July 1978 (not identifying: 75%) to 38% in March 1980 (not identifying: 55%).[13] In January 1980, more people had a good or very good opinion of the Ecology Movement (70%) than of any of the political parties (whose scores vary from 52% for the

Socialist Party to 27% for the Communist Party, with the others in between).[14] From 1975 to 1980, the credibility of "ecologists" on questions raised by nuclear power development went up compared to that of the government, and even more dramatically, that of EDF, the nationalized firm which runs the reactors. Asked whom they trusted more for information, the respondents gave the following answers (in per cent):[15]

	March 1975	March 1980
Trust "ecologists"	14	23
Trust government	17	20
Trust EDF	30	16

As a French author has concluded who has perhaps the best access to the survey data, including many unpublished ones, the audience of the Ecology Movement has quite clearly grown in the time period 1975-1980;[16] this coincides pretty well with the time period during which economic difficulties (high inflation, consistently rising unemployment) made themselves felt, with only a brief respite in 1976. It is true that there is a certain leveling off in some areas: thus support for nuclear power, which could only count on a minority in 1977 (the high point of dissent) is again majoritarian. But in general the picture is one of relative stabilization. Nonetheless the success of the Ecology Movement in politics is still very modest. Perhaps this has something to do with the outlook of the public: according to one 1980 survey 59% of the respondents thought that the Ecology Movement must limit itself to raising the great problems without getting mixed up in politics (30% thinking that it should assume responsibility in political life); at the same time 54% thought that it was desirable for an Ecology candidate to run for the Presidency

in 1981 (22%: undesirable). And still in the same survey 9% said that there were very good chances, another 18% that there were pretty good chances, that they would vote for such a candidate.[17] But despite similarly high expressions of intent in the past, the figures obtained by Ecology candidates have been more modest, even if they have been on the rise: 1.3% at the presidential elections in 1974 (when "political ecology" made its first appearance in France, with the candidacy of René Dumont); 2% in the legislative elections of 1978 (a strongly polarized election between the two camps); and 4.5% at the elections for the European Parliament of June 1979, just falling short of the 5% required for representation.[17a] These contrasts call for an explanation.

But first more data involving other countries shall be presented, dealing with somewhat different aspects. In Germany also, sympathy for the Ecology Movement appears to have risen over the last decade. Citizens' initiatives, who in terms of memberships have come to outnumber the political parties,[18] involve a great deal more activism and militancy than party membersip; more than half of those initiatives appear to be in the area of ecology in a comprehensive sense (including urban congestion, parks, etc.).[19] They have been instrumental in slowing down (by protests, legal challenges and the like) the German nuclear power program, which is supported not only by the leadership of the two largest parties but also by most of industry and organized labor. Despite this apparent strength in one area (where, it is true, they are assisted by German law, which grants them forms of participation unknown in France), the Ecology Movement remains weak in the area of party politics. The Green Party has conquered seats in a few Land elections, but failed (in 1980) to

muster the necessary 5% to get into the Bundestag.[19a] Does this mean that whatever the preferences expressed in surveys, and however impressive in organizing ad hoc-groups, the Ecology Movement cannot acquire political strength because the loyalties do not go deep enough? Are people still, as Inglehart holds, materialists in their majority, with the unequivocal postmaterialists still a small minority?[20]

Such a reasoning seems to be contradicted by the results of another form of politics in which the Ecology Movement has done surprisingly well, namely the energy referenda held in several European countries during the last few years. The first one of these was held in Austria. A nuclear power plant had been completed there, and was ready to go in operation. The government (the Social Democrats under Kreisky) argued strongly in favor of it, stressing that it was necessary to secure rising prosperity and full employment; in this it was backed by organized labor and industry, but (though not very outspokenly) criticized by the conservative People's Party. In the referendum held in November 1978, the opposition to the power plant carried with a slim majority, and the plant was mothballed (though efforts to reverse the earlier result are under way).-- Soon afterwards Swiss voters had to decide whether people residing in the vicinity of a site selected for a nuclear power plant should have the right to veto such a project. Despite a constellation of support similar to the Austrian case, the result was again close; this time, a slim majority decided in favor of nuclear power, i.e. not to give the right to veto to local area residents. In Sweden finally, a referendum was held in March 1980; and even though the "ecological" alternative (phase out nuclear power within 10 years, no new reactors to

be put in operation) gathered only 38.3% of the vote, it must be remembered that all alternatives (undoubtedly under the impact of the anti-nuclear movement) proposed to phase out nuclear power within 25 years.[21]

The above data show that the orientations which are expressing themselves through the Ecology Movement are not merely fashionable or superficial and linked to times of affluence; the energy crisis did not bring about their widely predicted collapse. Pointing in the same direction, the old rallying cries of rising standard of living, full employment and the like no longer exercise the same fascination. Still it remains to be explained why support for the Ecology Movement varies so greatly, depending on the dimension affected. Particularly striking is the success in referenda and the lack of it in elections. Is it because the referenda deal only with one issue that raises fewer problems? That seems unlikely, since opposition to nuclear power is also central to the Ecology Parties; too much so, it will be argued. That may be the problem: one expects more from a party than a position on just one or a very few issues. Not that such parties have not existed in the past: witness the "flash parties" of the French Fourth Republic, or the single-issue parties of Weimar Germany. The important difference between those parties and the Ecology Movement is that the former had no comprehensive approach to politics and were merely a pressure group that took the form of a party; the latter by contrast has a fully developed philosophy which it can inspire an alternative to present industrial society, but has not yet applied itself to working out the implications of such a philosophy to the issues which confront industrial societies in their day-to-day functioning. For the citizens of those societies, there are many questions other than energy and the environment which need to be addressed and expressed

in politics. As long as the Ecology Movement refuses to take these questions into consideration, it should not expect to be successful in electoral terms; nor can it live up to its promise and potential. In the meantime, forces in society and politics produce an apparently irresistible impetus towards expansion (or in times when expansion cannot be achieved, towards inflation.)[22] These forces shall now be looked at more closely.

Forces Shaping Resource Allocation in Industrial Societies: Initiating and Reacting

Western industrial societies allocate resources by two main mechanisms or systems; they use both politics and markets. Each system has its own actors, few of which have initiative. Most are "reactive" in the sense that they are reacting to changes that have originated elsewhere; yet they too shape resource allocation by contributing their ownd demands, which help to propel society along on its present course since they usually intensify the impulses working in the directinn of growth rather than check those impulses.

Consumers: Within the system of the market, the main actors are consumers and producers, especially but not exclusively business and labor. The theory of consumer sovereignty holds that initiative rests with consumers: the market produces what they, as consumers, demand. If industrial societies pursue a course of expansion, and a type of expansion that conflicts with ecological equilibrium, the reason is that consumers want it this way; their behavior at the cash register, highly concrete and

specific, should be considered as more indicative of their true preferences than their responses to public opinion surveys.

While such an interpretation is quite frequent, it can be questioned from several points of view. Not it is true that people generally, at least in non-traditional societies, aspire to a "better" life; and also that this aspiration will often take economic forms. Under certain circumstances a general rise in the standard of living will indeed increase overall welfare (as in the Depression, or during the postwar years in Europe). It would also be normal to expect that saturation would set in once a certain level of affluence has been achieved; and that seems to have happened in Europe during the 1970s.[23] A point is conceivable where the negative consequences of growth (congestion, crowding, efforts required to keep up) will outweigh the positive ones, particularly as positional goods are becoming more important (i.e. goods which are by their nature scarce and cannot be multiplied). Will economic growth then come to an end at this point? The problem from the perspective of the consumer is the following: what cannot be obtained by all (i.e. a privileged position in society) can still aspired to, and pursued, by all, even if only some can win (in the sense of achieving the goal) and all will lose (in the sense of having to make greater efforts due to the intensified competition, a loss that is compensated for only a minority by definition. While economic growth as a strategy of collective advance has become absurd under these conditions, it is still rational from the perspective of the individual incapable of (or unwilling to pursue) collective action. That, of course, is the situation of the consumer. He does not have the initiative; he only reacts to the logic of an environment which he cannot control, and

which leads him to absurd choices . This is exactly the classic situation of the "tragedy of the commons", described by Garrett Hardin.[24]

Did economic growth in postwar Europe develop because of rising consumer demand? That would ignore that the rise in demand was itself largely the product of the Marshall Plan, and later on of those policies which sought to deal with the problem of redistribution by increasing the size of the pie, according to the "social-democratic consensus" as described by Dahrendorf, which came to characterize the pragmatic postwar parties and labor unions as well as social planners and bureaucrats. Growth is seen as the major equalizing agent, though equality is to be understood over time: what the wealthy have today, everyone will have tomorrow. Society is like a column on the march. But neglected in this picture, or rather in the analysis, is that the advance of the vanguard of the column exerts pressure on the tail end to catch up, unless it (the tail end of the column, i.e. of society) is prepared to see its own conditions of life deteriorate;

> This will be an important drive for increased economic activity, conventionally classified as economic growth. But in the conditions currently prevailing, the economic advance will be in economic output in the "gross" sense. . .to the extent that growth in economic activity has an adverse effect on these conditions, . . . the forward march of the column as a whole could be pictured as if occurring on a travellator moving in the reverse direction, and powered by the marching column itself.[25]

Under those circumstances, growth as a collective strategy is both absurd and self-propelling. It is hard to break this cycle, since individuals can only do so at their own expense (falling further behind). Only political action (unlikely to originate with consumers) can overcome this dilemma. Labor unions are very much caught in a similar dilemma, while business is likely to exacerbate it, with both following the logic of the market. These points will now be explored in turn.

Labor unions: The purpose of labor unions is to improve as much as possible, and over the long term, the material conditions of life for their members. For most of them, this has meant the acceptance of a "trade-unionist" strategy focusing on narrow economic gains rather than pursuing broader goals. In the postwar decades, this served an important function: economic systems geared to mass production for mass markets required a working class with greater purchasing power than it had had in the past. Again the Marshall Plan was crucial in securing this change, both for the unions and for the productive apparatus (and it was understood by its framers that the two went together).[26] Once the growth process is under way, labor unions (at least in countries in which the union movement is not centralized) are of course locked into the tragedy of the commons-pattern just as consumers are; and it is not particularly surprising if they have consistently denied any special responsibility for accelerating this cycle when it led no longer to growth but to inflation. As Goldthorpe put it, "in a free-for-all, the unions are part of the all."[27] They have shown somewhat greater restraint in most of the corporatist systems where they are more centralized (thus e.g. in Germany and Austria, though not in Sweden in May 1980). But even centralized unions cannot deal with the basic problem of the "tragedy of the commons", since tho who competitively exploit the commons include not only organized labor, but other interest groups as well. In any case, most unions are still attached to the orthodoxy of the social-democratic consensus: that growth will bring advance for all.

Business: It is usually recognized that business has some power of its own, unless one accepts the theory of consumer sovereignty according to which business only responds to consumer demands. As Lindblom

describes this power, it is exercized either through the market, or through politics. But even when they act in the market, businessmen exercize "public functions" : they make decisions on such matters as levels of employment, investment, distribution of income, development of certain technologies and siting of plants, etc. It is important for business to do its job well; and this need for its services enables it to demand a certain amount of freedom of state control as well as rewards to motivate and sanction good performance. As a result, "a broad area of public decision-making is removed from polyarchal control."[28]

> The systems we call polyarchies are in fact complex systems in which two forms of control operate on government officials: those of polyarchy and those exercized by businessmen through their privileged position. Thus, there are two groups of leaders. But only one of them is systematically subject to polyarchal control.[29]

That business has an interest in economic growth will be assumed for the present purpose. The case has been argued persuasively by Galbraith (and if one follows Lindblom, it would be rather surprising if this interest could not be translated into reality given the privileged position of business). Perhaps the weakest point in Galbraith in his reliance on advertising to explain why the public as consumers accept the lifestyle sold by the large corporations. Fred Hirsch argues more convincingly that corporations need not "bamboozle" (Galbraith) the public. Thanks to the structure of the market, which reduces the people to consumers incapable of collective action and thus liable to pursue individualistic strategies even when they tend to become absurd, an effective sales strategy relies less on advertising than on the fact that each consumer will view the product that

he buys in isolation from its condition of use; perhaps ignoring that if many people make the same purchase, those conditions may be adversely affected (as when a hundred dune buggies head at the same time for the "deserted", because previously inaccessible, beach); or perhaps knowing that those conditions will be adversely affected anyhow, and thus make impossible those kinds of enjoyment that were available before the product was launched, or mass-produced. In this way the market can create an outcome directly opposed to what individuals really want:

> The outcome of the chain of private market decisions will not conform to what consumers sought in their individual purchases; yet each consumer will come out even worse himself unless he acts in what, collectively, is a self-defeating way.[30]

From the businessman's perspective, things might look different: He can view himself as satisfying "rising expectations." In any case, the logic of the market works in his favor and enhances his position.

State bureaucracies. After the market, let us look at politics as a system of resource allocation. In the case of state bureaucracies, we are again dealing with an actor that is favorably oriented toward growth, partly because it usually defines improvements in social welfare in growth terms, even when the pattern ends up being absurd in terms of its original goal (see the preceeding discussion of the "advancing column" on an escalator, which it propells in reverse direction). Even without egalitarian preoccupations, state bureaucracies will tend to view growth

> as a way to meet conflict between large groups in society, or rather to ward off such conflict, thus securing national cohesion.[31]

(Again this purpose may still be served to a minor extent when such conflict is no longer resolved by growth but by inflation, which can be viewed as a

relatively non-violent form of group conflict).[32] Here the situation appears to be changing though: while certain cnnflicts (in particular those involving business, labor and other economic interest groups) can still be moderated by growth (and perhaps even by inflation; the monetary illusion) such a policy has on occasion led to open confrontation, with the interest groups all on one side and a large part of the population (a majority in the case of Austria's nuclear referendum of 1978) on the other: this is hardly a prescription for domestic harmony. A reasoning of this kind seems to underlie the thinking of Giscard d'Estaing, who has argued that a slower growth ("croissance douce") would be better for maintaining the cohesion of French society (a view challenged by the other three major parties in France).[33]

But there is more to the perceived merits of economic growth, from the point of view of state bureaucracies, than its domestic aspect. A growing economy is usually seen as a key ingredient of national power, and as the basis for other forms of national power (military power; financial influence; and the like). In this respect the growth race differs not so greatly from the armaments race; both are governed by the logic of the commons. As a German minister put it, aware of the challenges to a policy set on growth:

> A country that in contrast to others would all by itself abstain from the global growth effort would consciously choose the path of underdevelopment. Even if one may regret it: there is no identifiable substitute for economic growth.[33a]

Finally, state bureaucracies are likely to have an additional interest of their own in the pursuit of economic expansion. The public sector can grow with ease only as long as the private sector is also expanding. Such

a concern acquires new urgency in the late 20th century, when a host of governmental programs is endangered unless growth continues.[34] It is true that many of the programs at stake deal with the costs resulting from growth (e.g. greater infrastructure demands and the like); but the interest of the bureaucracy is to expand its field of action, not to restrict it, and thus both to continue economic expansion and to expand remedial policy.[35]

Political Parties. The decades after World War II saw the decline of the old goals of many parties, goals which were phrased in absolute terms and could not be compromised. In part, some of these goals had lost some of their appeal; in part, the new economic situation simply allowed accommodation of many demands that previously were viewed as conflicting, thus contributing to the "end of ideology." The old legitimacy was replaced by a new one: the claim to be able of managing economy and society in the most effective and most progressive way, with considerable consensus on what effective and progressive management meant. The emphasis on good economic performance (embodied in a high growth rate and full of employment) led to a politics in which the parties would outbid each other--a process attacked by critics of Keynesianism as inflationary.[36] However, it should be remembered that what in the economic environment of the late 1970's became inflationary could be viewed as a spur to growth in earlier years and decades. In any case, the new principle of legitimacy invoked by most political parties (i.e. the superior ability to manage the national economy) came itself under attack in the 1970's and decayed in turn:

> In all countries what seems to have been at stake was an explosion of doubt about the quality and direction of life in advanced industrial societies, about...the irreconcilability of the kinds of organization required to run an industrial society with the values and personal

> relationships that are necessary for the satisfaction of deep human needs. This was a protest not against the failure of state and society to provide for economic growth and material prosperity, but against their all-too-considerable success in having done so, and against the price of this success.[37]

More than from interest groups, one would expect from political parties that they would be sensitive to a shift in outlook and aspirations such as the one that occured in the 1970's. But if effective economic management decayed as a principle of legitimacy for political programs and action, it retained an impressive hold on the thinking of political parties to whom it had become the new ideology and in fact orthodoxy. According to Suzanne Berger, this is "the great missed opportunity of the last decade" : the fact that the parties have, as a group, failed to incorporate the new demands, thus further undermining their own position and provoking a participatory movement which is not only anti-interest group, and anti-state, but also anti-party.[38] It is true that she lists an additional reason for the decline of the parties: the decline of parliaments everywhere; as a result, the parties became not only cut off from the electorate but also, to some extent, from the interest group.[39]

In the textbook version of representative liberal democracy, economic and social policies are made--at least in their great outlines--by the national Parliament. It has been some time that this description has been accepted as unrealistic; the assumed decline or abdication of Parliaments gave rise to a literature of its own. It can be questioned whether Parliaments in the 20th century ever had much initiative in the making of economic and social policies. During the reign of the liberal state--

which generally prevailed until the Great Depression or World War II--the state did not accept the role played today by "active government"; and whatever progress towards active government had been made in the wake of World War I was soon annulled in the interwar deflation. The involvement in the international liberal economy was seen as making any activist policies, e.g. towards employment, impossible.[40] The undemocratic regimes of Italy and Germany were the first to react against this state of affairs; but their policy was not made in a democratic way. When after World War II governments expanded their functions in most Western countries, this coincided both with the development of corporatist, generally tripartite, institutions[41] (as an alternative forum to parliament) and the more or less one-dimensional "policies of productivity" and growth of the "end of ideology". All these changes reduced the functions, and the importance, not only of political parties, but also of a politically active public in general, and of course also of parliaments. Corporatist policy-making combined with relative political passivity of the public (at least in the area of economic and social policy) and relative inactivity of parliaments; this was the dominant mode of policy-making (the corporatist pattern) that has prevailed for several decades now. It is this whole pattern which during the 1970's has come under attack, and which appears now as unstable and perhaps fragile. For the citizenry has become active again during the last decade, but there are no avenues of participation which are open--at least not open to the new aspirations that came to the fore during this time period.

The Corporatist Pattern. All the actors in the corporatist pattern, as shown above, are oriented towards growth, though not always for the same reason; and their interaction adds to the need for such expansion. The

initiative is likely to lie with business and the state bureaucracy; organized labor and consumers are more likely to be reactive in their contribution, reflecting social pressures resulting from the growth process though at the same time intensifying and accelerating that process. Political parties too feed on this process (and into it) by diverting part of the additional wealth into programs of public policy. Thus the corporatist pattern has a built-in tendency towards growth and is likely to persist in this path. For an activist public to question this pattern of policy is logically perceived as an irrational interference, introducing dysfunctional conflicts and Luddite elements.[42] From the perspective of the corporatist pattern, the problem of the 1970s was the difficulty encountered in achieving economic growth; the conflicts which used to propel society along that path in the days of affluence now resulted in inflation. For this reason,

> The control of inflation and the promotion of economic growth. . . must have top priority on the agenda of democracy. . . The specific measures by which governments can promote these goals must be devised by economists and planners. . . It is necessary to underlie the extent to which the governability of democracy seems dependant upon the sustained expansion of the economy. Political democracy requires economic growth. . .[43]

The above report to the Trilateral Commission thus envisions a future firmly in the tradition of the policies of productivity and the end of ideology. The major political choice is to pursue growth; the means to be worked out by "economists and planners." The public does best by refraining from "excessive participation," as Huntington might put it.[44] And in fact, it only stands to reason that in the one-dimensional, technical world of the

manager, the public should be passive and deferential and abdicate the political realm. Its legitimate sphere is not the world of political action, but of socio-economic behavior.[45] Not that participation is not desired at all; but only on behalf of the goals that the system can pursue.

The Participatory Pattern. It is this whole pattern, this whole understanding of politics which came under attack in the 1970's, with the Ecology Movement playing a central role. Subject to criticism was, first of all, the traditional goal: Produce more in order to create a better life for all. Rejected was the claim that "a state and society are legitimized merely by the provision of ever-increasing sums of material goods to its members."[46] This rebounded on the prominent role given to the main actors on the corporatist pattern, weakening their claim to legitimacy. It also rebounded on the political parties, which stuck to an ideology that justified the old policy and showed themselves impressively unresponsive to the new aspirations and criticisms. This in turn affected the legitimacy of parliaments. With such a wholesale condemnation of all those forms of politics which had been dominant for decades, what was there left? What could give form to the new, intensely participatory politics of ad hoc-groups, local initiatives, spontaneous demonstrations? To the activists this did not always seem an important question. To them, what mattered was not to get a foothold in the places of authoritative decision-making (which were categorically rejected) but to mobilize sympathy for their goals, to show their strength, usually in opposition to the official politics. The struggle was not over strongholds of power but over the sympathy of the public. In terms of political strategy this inevitably led to a politics of confrontation with the state where criticism of--and attacks on--the old orthodoxy, the corporatist pattern, and the political parties are all joined together.

The Politics of Confrontation. What forms does this politics take? There seems to be two main trends; one could be called "containment," the other "subversion"; both are highly conflictual. Containment refers to the efforts, e.g. of the Ecology Movement, to prevent the course of development on which Western industrial societies are propelled from impacting upon certain areas. Thus, in the field of energy, the problem of nuclear power: The need for nuclear power has arisen at least in part because of the efforts for economic expansion and increasing productivity; similar priorities in other areas only create lax control of pollution or land use patterns which endanger ecological equilibrium. The effects thus produced--which are only symptoms of the chosen course of development-- are the target of the most direct attacks by the Ecology Movement. Not that it is content with this, as its philosophy indicates, which questions growth on much broader grounds. And in fact it does attack the very legitimacy of growth policies on ideological grounds, thus weakening the legitimacy not only of the policy but also of all those actors and institutions which put it to practice. This could appropriately be called the politics of subversion. Containment and subversion--the terms and the pattern are familiar from the Cold War--have in common their implication for high levels of conflict. Implicity they demand a test of strength, such as the one now under way in Germany with regard to the Brokdorf nuclear power plant, regarded as a symbol and a test case by both sides. The above-mentioned referenda in Austria and Sweden can also be viewed as a test. But even assuming that such tests can be won: can the policies of participation come to replace the pattern of corporatist policy-making?

It is quite clear that it cannot. For one thing, the participatory policies of "containment" and "subversion" are reactive: they do not participate in the formulation of most public policy regarding economic matters, but only challenge the results at a fairly advanced stage. Let us take the

extreme example so far, the case of the Austrian nuclear referendum. It outlawed the use of a nuclear power plant after the latter had been fully completed at considerable expense, and had for a long time represented a central part of Austrian energy policy. Now energy policy is designed to meet a demand resulting from many other decisions and policies. Most important perhaps in this context was the conscious policy of industrialization (in the sense of concentration of economic activities on transformative processes), a policy which in turn was understood as a condition of a better life and greater equity. The Ecology Movement has attacked the ultimate goals as well as the result flowing from them in the field of energy, and it carried a majority in the referendum of 1978. Nuclear energy was banned by law; but industrialization policies, international economic policies, redistributive policies and many more remained unaffected; and even in the field of energy policy proper (e.g. in the field of conservation) no decisive modification occurred. Under those circumstances, it is not surprising if in 1980 the same groups that had pressed for nuclear energy in 1978, and had lost, could claim that the situation had changed, that there was an "objective" need now for this form of this energy which had only now acquired such intensity. This is the logic of the force of things, the often invoked Sachzwang. And to the extent that new constraints have built up (and they do tend to build up as long as energy demand is not brought under control, which hardly can be achieved unless measures are taken in other areas as well), such a logic, the apparent logic of things and of technique, is indeed compelling. The willingness to deal with the underlying problems

might exists in Austria (though I realize that one should be wary of public opinion surveys): In 1979, 83% of a sample of Austrian respondents agreed that "A policy that one could take seriously would have to give priority to the protection of nature, to a policy of preventive medicine, the humanization of work, to rescuing the cities from traffic congestion and similar problems, even if this requires heavy sacrifices and painful adaptations."47 But even strongly prevalent opinions, though they can be translated into some political power in referendum, will not by themselves change the underlying course of public policy. Mere confrontation has its limits. To go beyond it, the Ecology Movement will have to enter the field of policy-making itself. It has done so recently, with the rise of the Green parties; but so far with little success. Perhaps this relative failure can also be understood in terms of what has already been said.

Up to now, even when the Ecology Movement did put up candidates, these seemed to voice more the kinds of concerns that are typical of a pressure group rather than of a political party. As in the case of pressure groups, these concerns are usually narrow: energy programs; siting controversies; protection of nature in a narrow sense of remedial pollution control. Quite frequently no positions are taken up with regard to a whole range of issues that are all important both for the evolution of advanced industrial societies and to its citizens. Can one, for example, propose the reorientation of the course of the German economic development (a key goal of the Green party) without at the same time discussing the problems of exports (and most European countries are very dependant on the world economy), or that of employment, productivity, and redistribution? Yet these questions are not dealt with, even though they are important to the public, who is well aware of problems in these areas in the post-1974 environment. And as long as no position in

these fields are worked out, the Ecology Movement cannot appear credible to the probably large numbers of people who might be inclined to vote for it.[48] Perhaps taking position in these areas is avoided since this might lead to conflicts within the Ecology Movement, which after all does include rather diverse groups. The net effect however is not to increase the efficiency of the movement, but to neutralize part of its energies, giving it the appearance of a pressure group.

An Alternative Politics. This situation is quite ironic. For unlike pressure group parties (such as the Poujadistes of the Fourth Republic in France, or some of the small parties in Weimar Republic) an Ecology Party would have a broad potential constituency as well as a philosophical basis which would allow it to deal with a whole range of issues and concerns. If a historical parallel is to be drawn, the present situation of the Ecology Movement might be compared with the situation, particularly in Italy, of Socialism and Social Catholicism in the late 19th century, at a time when those movements had a basis in terms of philosophy but, for reasons of suffrage limitations or the stance of the Church, were not yet active in electoral policies. As a result both movements radically rejected the existing political institutions: the capitalist liberal state in one case; the post-1870 Italian state in the other.

As mentioned before, the Ecology Movement has a philosophy which, if only its implications were worked out and applied to the many areas of life of modern industrial societies, could provide political inspiration for a wide range of concerns; it is an effort to subordinate economic and social life to collectively, politically, established priorities. Again this represents a parallel with the reformist movements of socialism and reformist

Catholicism, even though their impact was often stunted by the structure of the liberal state and its belief in self-regulation at first, and later by the policies of deflation and abandonment of social reform (in the 1920s).[49] They in in turn were displaced by fascism, then by Keynesianism and the politics of productivity and growth, and the depoliticization ("end of ideology", corporatist structures, parties in decline) that went hand in hand with such developments. Depolitic-ized policies of the established policy-makers; anti-politics (to use Suzanne Berger's term) of the new movements: the result is that politics as the common meeting ground for social movements, ideas and interests remains a wasteland, or perhaps a virgin territory.

It is imperative then that the Ecology Movement become more truly political; and also that it take up those questions of policy which it must deal with if it is to live up to its vocation. It should try to acquire some initiative in the formation of public policy instead of merely reacting to what it considers to the wrong policies.

Does this mean that it should try to gain access to those forums where public policy is currently made? There are many valid reasons why such an approach should be distrusted. The corporatist pattern of policy-making is highly undemocratic and, as we saw before, intentionally designed to be this way; this means that the political strength derived from the public sympathy and support cannot be translated into influence in the bargaining process. That process, protected as it is from public influence and even scrutiny,[50] is too heavily biases against the Ecology Movement and its goals.

The alternative is of course to transfer policy-making to a forum which is neither secret nor closed to new inspiration and the values and concerns of a public that seems to be newly politicized. This would involve

strengthening those institutions in which parties can play a significant role, primarily the parliaments. Undoubtedly this would involve considerable change: up to now, parliaments have not really exercized much of the power that accrued to the state in the post-war period, and it remains to be seen whether they can put it to good use. Perhaps such change is unlikely, since it would deprive the actors of the corporatist policies of an important means of control over resource allocation. However, the same actors suffer from a legitimacy deficit which they may want to reverse. The Ecology Movement on the other hand stands to gain from such a change, provided it can live up to the challenges that this change will bring, above all the need to formulate public policy alternatives inspired by an alternative philosophy capable of drawing on the support of a newly politicized public. Perhaps its major impact will be to change the thinking of other parties, which at present are locked into the orthodoxy of the social-democratic consensus; but such a change should be welcome if it is more than cosmetic.

It remains of course possible that even a reformed liberal democratic system which has incorporated many of the goals of the Ecology Movement would not be able to bring the impulses towards expansion under control. As Lindblom has stressed, only part of national (and particulary economic) life is subject to political control which draws its legitimacy from the electorate.[51] If this obstacle cannot be overcome,[52] the time will come when it must be considered; but the existance of the obstacle has to be demonstrated first, and cannot simply be assumed; a simple assumption would not carry enough credibility with the public to move it, at this time, to take action. In the meantime, it is hardly appropriate for the Ecology Movement to limit

itself to the sphere of anti-politics and of reactive politics; they are more likely to lead to a dead end than to bring about the "ecological" and and also more humane future that so many, in the Western socities, apparently desire.

[1] This consensus came with the Marshall Plan. See Charles S. Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 23-50.

[2] For American views in this sense see e.g. Anthony Downs, "Up and Down With Ecology--The 'Issue-Attention Cycle'," The Public Interest, no. 28 (Summer 1972), p. 42 (ecology as a short-lived fashion); and Walter Rosenbaum, "Patterns of Ecological Mobilization: The United States," paper, International Studies Association Meeting, St. Louis, March 1977. It is of course possible that the situation in the United States differs from that in Europe.

[3] See my "Energy Policy and the Challenge of Public Participation" in Wilfrid L. Kohl, ed., After the Second Oil Crisis (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1981).

[4] It must be noted that the two policies are not absolutely incompatible, except if there is not enough capital to proceed simultaneously on both the "hard" and the "soft" energy paths; see Amory Lovins, "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken," Foreign Affairs, 55, (Fall 1976), pp. 65-96.

[5] Economie concertée involves close cooperation between big business and the state, as described for France by Stephen S. Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). By contrast, corporatism is usually defined as involving the state, business and labor as basic actors (possibly also others), though not necessarily on an equal level. See Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies," and Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government;" both in Comparative Political Studies, 10:1 (April 1977), pp. 61-90 and 91-126

respectively. Reginald J. Harrison, Pluralism and Corporatism(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980) seems to include both pehnomena in the term corporatism.

6 Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics in Western Europe in the Seventies," Daedalus, 108:1 (1979), pp. 27-50.

7 The insulation from rand-and-file pressure is stressed by Panitch; that from political parties by Lehmbruch. For both see fn. 5 above.

8 For the ideological character of this set of beliefs, see Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning, pp. 46-49. It became an important element of catch-all parties, who soon discovered that it did best "when able to redefine the whole problem and discover solutions which would work, at least in the long run, in the favor of all interest claimants concerned." Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard C. Brown, eds.,Comparative Politics, 5th. ed., 1977, pp. 358-371; quote from p.366. See also Berger,"Politics and Antipolitics", pp. 28-32.

9 Sheldon S. Wolin, "The People's Two Bodies," Democracy, 1:1 (January 1981), pp. 9-24. Wolin is discussing the American situation.

10 For such an interpretation see Françoise Bonnal, "L'évolution de l'opinion publique à l'égard de l'écologie au travers des sondages," paper prepared for the symposium on "Ecologisme et Politique" organized by the French Political Science Association, 26 September 1980.

11 Surveys conducted in the countries of the European Community show a greatly similar evolution, and also a rise of the "ecological" orientation from 1974 to 1976, despite the intervening recession. See Eurobarometre (Brussels), No. 2 Table 2A (Oct. Nov. 1974), No. 3 Table 3A (May 1975),

No. 4 Table 3 (Oct. Nov. 1975) and No. 5 Table 2 (May 1976).

12 Both surveys by SOFRES , Paris.

13 First survey by IFOP; second by SOFRES.

14 SOFRES.

15 Both surveys by SOFRES. The questions were not formulated in exactly the same way. but the trend seems clear.

16 Thus Françoise Bonnal, who gives a long list of additional surveys (and is also the source of many of the above data); p. 9.

17 All questions asked by SOFRES, March 1980.

17a Data from Françoise Bonnal, "L'évolution de l'opinion", p.11.

18 Peter Cornelius Mayer-Tasch, Die Buergerinitiativebewegung,(Reinbek; Rowohlt, 1976), p. 152.

19 Ibid. pp. 91-92.

19a Reinhard Meier, "The Green Front: Germany's Political Environmentalists," Swids Review of World Affairs, January 1980, pp. 6-8; and

20 Nicholas Watts and Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith,"Post material Values and Environmental Policy Change," Policy Studies Journal, 9:3 (Winter 1980', pp. 346-58.

21 See footnote 3 above.

22 Colin Crouch, "Inflation and the Political Organization of Economic Interests," in Fred Hirsch and John H. Goldthorpe, The Political Economy of Inflation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 217-239.

23 Business analysts voiced concern over such a development, which would reduce an important market for consumer goods. Wall Street Journal, 1 March 1976, p.1; and 7 March 1977, p. 1.

24 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science, 162 (13 December 1968), pp. 1243-48.

25 Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 168-69. Similarly Richard A. Easterlin, "Does Money Buy Happiness," The Public Interest, 30 (Winter 1973), pp. 3-10.

26 See fn. 1 above; and also David P. Calleo, "Keynes and the Pax Americana," in Robert Skidelsky, ed., The End of the Keynesian Era (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 93-103.

27 Goldthorpe discussed in Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth, p. 145; and in Laurence Whitehead, "The Political Causes of Inflation," Political Studies 27:4 (1980), pp. 564-577.

28 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 172.

29 Ibid. P. 189.

30 Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth, p. 109.

31 Charles Maier stresses this aspect for the United States: see source cited in fn. 1, at pp. 27-30. Gaullists never tire of stressing this aspect of growth for French society.

32 See fn. 27 above.

33 He argued this first at a conference sponsored by UNESCO in 1972, when he was still Finance Minister. See his contributions in Economie et Société Humaine (Paris: Denoël, 1972); also in his book Democratie francaise (1976). It is not evident that these views have guided his actual policy.

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33a Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 February 1976, p. 10.

34 Richard Rose and Guy Peters, Can Government Go Bankrupt?(New York: Basic Books, 1978), pp. 106-32 and 154-73.

35 I have discussed the role of the state at greater length in "Ecology Politics and Liberal Democracy," Government and Opposition, 13:2 (Spring 1978), pp. 199-217.

36 Thus Samuel Brittan, "Can Democracy Manage an Economy," in Skidelsky, ed., The End of the Keynesian Era, pp.41-49; also Rose and Peters, fn. 34 above.

37 Berger,"Politics and Antipolitics...", p. 32.

38 Ibid. pp. 30, 33, 39.

39 Ibid. p. 47; but she lists Italy as an exemption.

40 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," The Yale Review, 22:4 (Summer 1933), pp. 755-69.

41 See fn. 5 above.

42 Thus Samuel Huntington, "Post-Industrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?", Comparative Politics, 6:2 (January 1974), pp.163-91.

43 Michel J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975), pp. 174-75.

44 Ibid., p. 113.

45 Wolin, "The People's Two Bodies," p. 19; Kirk Thompson, "Constitutional Theory and Political Action," The Journal of Politics, 31 (1969), pp. 656-57.

46 Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics...", p. 33.

47 Survey by IFES, cited in Bernd Marin, "Neuer Populismus und 'Wirtschaftspartnerschaft'," Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 9:2 (1980), p. 176.

48 Rudolf Wildenmann estimated recently that the potential electorate of a Green Party in Germany was around 30% (Communication by P.C. Mayer-Tasch, 1980, Bologna).

49 See fn. 40.

50 Even where corporatism is formalized, as in Germany under the Economic Growth and Stability Act of 1967, the rule is secrecy, despite Schiller's declared intention of "transparence." See Georg Küster, "Germany," in Raymond Vernon, ed., Big Business and the State (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 71-72.

51 See fn. 28 and 29 above.

52 Already many governments possess an impressive instrumentarium with which to exercize control over business and labor. Thus the use of "voluntary" agreements with industry covering such matters as prices, investment, technology, employment, exports, import savings, industrial relations, product development, environmental protection etc.; and for relations with labor unions, "voluntary" social contracts whereby governments negotiate promises on social policy measures in exchange of union commitments to hold down wage demands etc. See (with examples from Britain) J. T. Winkler, "The Coming Corporatism," in Skidelsky, The End of the Keynesian Era, pp.78-87.